Przegląd Konstytucyjny http://www.przeglad.konstytucyjny.law.uj.edu.pl/ <p>Inicjatywa utworzenia Przeglądu Konstytucyjnego zrodziła się w gronie osób tworzących do marca 2016 r. Komitet Redakcyjny Przeglądu Sejmowego. Po rozwiązaniu Komitetu uznaliśmy za zasadne kontynuowanie działalności polegającej na wydawaniu pisma naukowego, które powinno stanowić ważny ośrodek polskiej myśli konstytucyjnej. Programowo nawiązujemy do założeń, które w 1993 r. legły u podstaw utworzenia Przeglądu Sejmowego i przez dwadzieścia trzy lata były przez jego Komitet Redakcyjny realizowane. O nawiązaniu do tych założeń świadczy też skład naszej Rady Programowej. Zaprosiliśmy do niej wybitnych przedstawicieli polskich konstytucjonalistów.</p> Uniwersytet Jagielloński, Krakowski Instytut Prawa Karnego Fundacja pl-PL Przegląd Konstytucyjny 2544-2031 Prawo do posiadania rodziny. O tym, jak Międzyamerykański Trybunał Praw Człowieka ukształtował konstytucyjne prawo Ekwadoru do zawierania małżeństw przez osoby tej samej płci http://www.przeglad.konstytucyjny.law.uj.edu.pl/article/view/391 <p><span class="fontstyle0">Tough a constitutionally recognized right to same-sex marriage remains the global minority view, in June 2019, Ecuador became the 27th country in the world to recognize this right. Following a binding advisory opinion issued by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR), the Constitutional Court of Ecuador (CCE) reinterpreted the Constitution of Ecuador to ensure that same-sex couples be granted the same title, rights, and benefits as their married heterosexual counterparts. Te IACHR’s advisory opinion focused on three elements: the developed trend for the interpretation of global laws, the relevant provisions of the American Convention on Human Rights, and the positive obligation of member States derived from the interpretation of these Convention provisions. This article will analyze these elements and discuss the extent to which the CCE relied on the IACHR’s interpretations to arrive at its holding.</span></p> Shelby Saxon ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2020-05-16 2020-05-16 1 5 32 Zasady ochrony własności w prawie karnym. O (nie) zasadności różnicowania ochrony własności prywatnej i państwowej w kodeksie karnym na płaszczyźnie typizacji http://www.przeglad.konstytucyjny.law.uj.edu.pl/article/view/392 <p><span class="fontstyle0">Te study is devoted to the issue of the model of property protection in criminal law. Starting from the constitutional principles of property protection, the article presents the constitutional typology of forms of ownership depending on the entity that owns the property. This is followed by an analysis of the normative&nbsp;</span><span class="fontstyle0">status, character, and functions of private, municipal, and state property. Grounded on the principle of a social market economy based on private property, the study provides an analysis of the social, economic, and constitutional function of this form of ownership. In the next step, the article presents the status of communal property, its constitutional functions, and relations to private and state property. Te study also contains the justification for the thesis on the functional approach to state property which, as a type of property, is not constitutional in its nature. In light of the analysis of the methods of infringement on the property and their social consequences, the author presents the justification of the thesis on the equal protection of all types of property in criminal law. He points out the arguments supporting the thesis that in the legal system<br>based on the concept of social market economy there is no justification for differentiating the methods and forms of criminal law protection of property depending on the entity to which ownership is vested. From the perspective of the principle of legal protection, there are currently no grounds for differentiating criminal law protection of state or social property. The social functions of property are associated with every constitutional type of this right, which further justifies the thesis that property should be protected in an equal<br>manner. Possible differentiation of the scope of responsibility for various attacks on property should be based on the assessment of the degree of social harmfulness of the act in relation to the circumstances of the evaluated case. The current criminal law protection of property guarantees adequate protection<br>of this right in relation to all its varieties, as well as enables individualization and differentiation of the scope of criminal liability for attacks on the property depending on the features of a particular case.</span> </p> Piotr Kardas ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2020-05-16 2020-05-16 1 33 55 „Ukryte kompetencje” Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w świetle Konstytucji RP http://www.przeglad.konstytucyjny.law.uj.edu.pl/article/view/393 <p><span class="fontstyle0">The article shows how to use imprecise provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland to strengthen the powers of the President. ‘Hidden’ competences are powers explicitly granted to the President in the Constitution but used in an unorthodox way, unforeseen by the creators of the Constitution. The article discusses five cases: 1) possibility to ‘push the Prime Minister out’ of the international event ‘hidden’ in the power to convene the first parliamentary meeting after the election; 2) a „small pocket veto” ‘hidden’ in the power to announce the bill in Journal of Laws within 21 days; 3) possibility of delaying of the signing of a bill ‘hidden’ in the mechanism of veto-withdrawal of veto challenge to the Constitutional Tribunal; 4) appointment of the presidential Prime Minister against the will of the parliament ‘hidden’ in the power to designate a temporary head of government; 5) possibility of evading the obligation to dissolve the parliament in the event of an inability to elect a government ‘hidden’ in the power to notify the Marshal of the Sejm of the temporary inability to hold office (the Constitution forbids Marshal of the Sejm, who acts<br>as the President, to dissolve the parliament).</span></p> Janusz Roszkiewicz ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2020-05-16 2020-05-16 1 56 75 Granice wykładni prokonstytucyjnej. Glosa do wyroku Sądu Najwyższego z 5 grudnia 2012 r., III KK 137/12 http://www.przeglad.konstytucyjny.law.uj.edu.pl/article/view/394 <p><span class="fontstyle0">The article presents a partially critical commentary on the judgment of the Supreme Court concerning an interpretation of Article 226 § 1 of the Polish Criminal Code (k.k.). Supreme Court overruled the challenged judgment and referred the case for re-examination, deciding that the public nature of the perpetrator’s act is not a constituent element of the crime of insulting a public officer. As the justification for this decision, the Supreme Court referred to the limits of the pro-constitutional interpretation. In this commentary, three issues are discussed. Firstly, a question concerning the limits of the pro-constitutional interpretation in the judicial process of application of the law. In the opinion of the author, such limits are set by the Constitution. Secondly, the importance of the pro-constitutional interpretation in the process of direct application<br>of the Constitution. The author argues that this type of interpretation cannot be perceived only as of the interpretive co-application of the Constitution and a statute. Courts should refer to the pro-constitutional interpretation before</span>&nbsp;<span class="fontstyle0">making a choice of the proper form of direct application of the Constitution.<br>Thirdly, a subject of the pro-constitutional interpretation of Article 226 § 1 k.k. According to the author, the pro-constitutional interpretation of Article 226 § 1 k.k. includes a necessity of adopting the literal interpretation according to which the public nature of the perpetrator’s act is not an element of the crime<br>described in Article 226 § k.k.</span> </p> Paulina Jabłońska ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2020-05-16 2020-05-16 1 76 86 Albrecht Weber, European Constitutions Compared, München – Oxford – Baden-Baden 2019, ss. 221 http://www.przeglad.konstytucyjny.law.uj.edu.pl/article/view/395 Monika Florczak-Wątor ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2020-05-16 2020-05-16 1 87 95 Konferencja naukowa pt. „Konstytucjonalizm polski” z okazji jubileuszu 45-lecia pracy naukowej oraz 70-lecia urodzin prof. dr. hab. Andrzeja Szmyta (Gdańsk, 6 marca 2020 r.) http://www.przeglad.konstytucyjny.law.uj.edu.pl/article/view/397 Aleksandra Szydzik ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2020-05-16 2020-05-16 1 96 102 Sprawozdanie z XXII Kongresu Europejskiego i Porównawczego Prawa Konstytucyjnego „Te Concept of Democracy as Developed by Constitutional Justice” (Wilno, 4–5 października 2019 r.) http://www.przeglad.konstytucyjny.law.uj.edu.pl/article/view/398 Maciej Serowaniec ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2020-05-16 2020-05-16 1 103 107